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1. Introduction
Utilising a series of recent Australian decisions, this paper reviews contemporary approaches
of the courts in relation to the relevance of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) to criminal
responsibility and culpability. It employs the definition of the disorder expected to be em‐
ployed in DSM-V (American Psychiatric Association, 26 January 2011), recognising that the
new formulation is broad-brush and does not avail itself of the nomenclature or separate
diagnostic criteria for Asperger’s Disorder.
It identifies a significant level of unawareness in Australian courts as to the distinctiveness,
and more importantly the potential significance of the distinctiveness, of the world experience
of those with symptomatology of the disorder and explores the challenge for mental health
experts in effectively assisting judicial officers to understand the internal experience of those
with ASD and differentiating it from personality disorders and psychopathy (see though
Fitzgerald, 2010).
Drawing on the reasoning in recent decisions, it argues that, while Asperger’s Disorder, and
to a lesser degree ASD, have now penetrated the public and judicial consciousness to some
degree, there is a significant forensic distance to travel and many challenges to be overcome
before courts are enabled meaningfully to appreciate for any given defendant the impact likely
to have been exercised on offending behaviour by an ASD. Identifying something of a backlash
against such a disorder being viewed as significantly mitigating in Australia, it advances
proposals for how mental health professionals can sensitise the courts more informedly to the
potential forensic significance of ASD.
© 2013 Freckelton; licensee InTech. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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2. ASD and the law
The preponderance of scholarship in relation to ASD and the criminal law has related to
persons with Asperger’s Disorder (see generally Murrie et al, 2002; Silva, Ferrari and Leong,
2003; Barry-Walsh and Mullen, 2004; Haskins and Silva, 2006; Warren, 2006; Langstrom et
al,  2009;  Freckelton  and  List,  2009;  Browning  and  Caulfield,  2011;  Freckelton,  2011;
Freckelton,  2013).  It  has  identified  issues  that  have  arisen  in  relation  to  fitness  to  be
interviewed,  fitness  to  stand trial,  capacity  to  form intent,  fitness  for  extradition,  defen‐
ces,  such as  self-defence,  insanity/mental  impairment,  diminished responsibility,  and,  in
particular, sentencing (see Warren, 2006; Freckelton and List, 2009; Freckelton, 2013). It has
also analysed particular categories of offences that have been committed by persons with
ASD:  offences  of  violence,  offences  against  public  order,  sexual  offences,  arson offences
and computer offences (see Realmuto and Ruble, 1998; Milton et al, 2002; Mouridsen et al,
2008;  Freckelton,  2011;  2013;).  Awareness  amongst  judicial  officers’  decisions  of  the
potential relevance of the disorder arises principally from expert insights into the fact that
those with ASD experience the world in a way that is at major variance from those without
the disorder. The disorder can be marked by obsessionality, inability to apprehend verbal
and  non-verbal  cues,  lack  of  empathy,  rigidity,  literalism  in  response,  naivete  and  a
propensity  to  panic  and  behave  impulsively  and  unpredictably  in  unfamiliar  environ‐
ments. (see eg R v Mueller,  2005 at [92]; McC v The Queen,  2007). Such persons may also
be very suggestible (see eg IA v The Queen, 2005 at [8]), have an aversion to being touched
by others (see eg ZH v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, 2012) or be distressed
by  sensory  perceptions  such  as  noise  or  intense  light  (see  Cascio  et  al,  2012),  possibly
because of sensory processing deficits (see Lane, Young, Baker and Angley, 2010). There
are  important  indications  that  persons  with  ASD  are  significantly  over-represented  as
persons in custody (Cashin and Newman, 2009; Mayes, 2003; Scragg and Shah, 1994).
There are indications arising from court decisions that mental health experts in the forensic
area and judicial officers alike have not always been as aware of the counter-intuitive charac‐
teristics of ASD as they need to be so that fair decisions are made by courts about procedural
issues arising in criminal trials, as well as about both the criminal responsibility and culpability
of those with ASD.
As of 2013, it can be said that the incidence of cases in which ASD is invoked as relevant to
criminal trials or sentencing appears to be growing. Part of this is attributable to increasing
awareness of ASD within the general population and by extension within the legal community.
This highlights the need for more focused and expert specialist assessment of defendants for
whom their ASD may constitute an important aspect of their defence (Freckelton and Selby,
2013; Freckelton, 2013). In this paper recent Australian decisions have been selected for
evaluation as illustrative of the complex forensic and mental health issues which continue to
be confronted by the courts, even in a jurisdiction which has had a disproportionate number
of appellate decisions which have wrestled with the forensic significance of ASD.
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3. R v George (2004)
One of Australia’s earliest and most significant decisions in relation to ASD in the criminal
law, but which has not previously been scrutinised, save in relation to issues relating to
hoarding and the law (Freckelton, 2012), was that of R v George (2004).
George was found guilty at first instance in the New South Wales Supreme Court of man‐
slaughter of his 86 year old mother (for whom he was the primary carer) by criminal negligence
arising from his failure to provide her with proper nutrition, hydration, medication and
medical attention. He was sentenced after trial to imprisonment for seven years with a non-
parole period of four years.
George appealed to the New South Wales Court of Appeal (R v George, 2004) on the ground
that insufficient weight was given by the sentencing judge to the fact that he suffered from
Asperger’s Disorder and other psychological issues that resulted from a solitary life and social
dysfunction. The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and reduced his sentence to three years
and six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years.
The evidence before the Court was that at the time of his mother’s death George was 58 years
of age and had never married. He lived until the time of her death with his mother and a
developmentally delayed sister. He had generally been unemployed although latterly he had
undertaken some minor administrative functions at a chiropractic clinic.
About two years before her death, George’s mother had instructed her children not to arrange
home care for her as she was embarrassed by the state of her house and its surrounds. The
garden was seriously overgrown and unkempt and the interior of the house was overrun by
papers, some of which were kept in bags and piled in various rooms. The shower and the bath
had not worked in some time. Newspapers were stacked in the shower recess and the toilet
leaked. Thick dust and cobwebs were to be found throughout the house.
Evidence before the Supreme Court at the time of the manslaughter trial established that
George’s mother had been a domineering person and had vigorously resisted all efforts to take
her to hospital and provide her with home care. She had an aversion to being showered.
George’s culpability depended on the sufficiency or otherwise of efforts he had made to
provide her with care as her condition deteriorated. When ambulance officers discovered her,
she was bed ridden and covered in sores. She was wearing soiled clothing and her bed and
person were covered in human vomitus, faeces, urine and body fluids. She was severely
malnourished and shortly afterwards died of bronchial pneumonia. Evidence established that
she had not been provided with prescribed medicine for some years and that she had suffered
significantly, especially in the latter stages of her life.
Psychiatric evidence shed some light on the reasons for the insufficiency of George’s responses
to his mother’s worsening health condition. It suggested that George had a “mild variant of
an autistic disorder”, a diagnostic criterion for which was “a lack of social or emotional
reciprocity, which could partly explain his apparent lack of concern for his mother’s condi‐
tion.” (R v George, 2004: [23]) The psychiatrist noted that George had an apparently consuming
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interest (typical of persons with Asperger’s Disorder) in all things related to railways. He noted
that: “The idiosyncratic thinking that is usually observed in the presence of Mr George’s
disorder could also explain his rather literal interpretation of his mother’s instructions and his
apparent lack of concern when interviewed about the events.” (R v George, 2004: [23]) He
explained this further as incorporating a difficulty in George having a normal level of empathy
and an capacity to recognize and respond to the reactions of others by reason of his lack of
empathy.
On appeal the Court found that the sentencing judge’s failure to deal explicitly with these
considerations “was a deficiency of some importance” in that it significantly reduced George’s
level of culpability:
Upon the evidence his capacity to respond to his responsibilities was clearly impaired by an unusual personality disorder
arising from his history of social dysfunction, as evidenced by the utterly bizarre circumstances in which he, and the
immediate family, lived.
The case is a tragic and wholly exceptional one, and we are driven to the conclusion that the Applicant’s objective
criminality was overstated by his Honour. As Dr Nielssen explained, Asperger’s Syndrome is not normally associated
with criminal offending, and the risk of the Applicant reoffending, or of being placed in a similar situation, is minimal.
Personal deterrence is, accordingly, of little relevance. (R v George, 2004: [42]-[43])
R v George  (2004) is  significant as it  is  Australia’s first  appellate authority on the poten‐
tial  relevance  of  ASD  symptomatology  to  the  evaluation  of  criminal  culpability.  Its
recognition of the distinctive propensity of persons with an ASD to comply with the plain
words  of  instructions  from  a  trusted  person  and  not  to  respond  emotionally  even  to
manifest  suffering,  if  such  a  response  is  interpreted  by  them  as  inconsistent  with  the
instructions  given to  them,  is  consistent  with  clinical  insights  into  the  characteristics  of
persons with ASD. It highlights that the lack of empathy of a person with ASD is prone
to be interpreted as malign intent (eg criminal mens rea) unless counter-intuitive expert
evidence is provided to the contrary.
4. R v Hampson (2011)
Bradley Hampson, a man of 29, pleaded guilty to a range of offences relating to possession
and distribution of child pornography. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with
release after 12 months and then two years’ probation. He appealed to the Queensland Court
of Appeal (R v Hampson, 2011) on the basis that his sentence was manifestly excessive. He had
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a prior conviction for using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence – when he
had telephoned persons and made lewd inquiries of them.
Evidence before the Court of Appeal established that Hampson had been diagnosed with
autism by a psychologist to whom he had been referred when he applied for a disability
support pension. The criminal conduct the subject of his sentence appeal included posting
sexually offensive observations on the tribute page for a murder victim and the distribution
of obscene comments and sexualized depictions of children. The sentencing judge described
Hampson’s conduct as “depraved”.
The sentencing judge acknowledged that: “It seems that the origin of your offending may lie
somewhere in your history of autism and in your own social ineptitude which led you to
misusing the internet in the way you did.” (R v Hampson, 2011: [57]) The Court of Appeal,
however, concluded that little weight should be given to Hampson’s autism for the purposes
of assessing his criminal culpability and that the trial judge’s incorporation of the condition
into his sentencing analysis was proper but sufficient.
The Hampson decision raises the difficult issue of the blameworthiness of persons with ASD
for conduct that would be considered difficult to understand and repugnant in ordinary
members of the community. Persons with ASD are frequently absorbed by persons, objects
and details. They can be very concrete in their reactions (see eg R v George, 2004). They can
have a propensity to engage in repetitive and obsessive behaviours, especially within the
unthreatening environment of the Internet.
In the Ontario case of R v Somogyi (2011) a man found guilty of luring two girls under the age
of 14 and inviting them to engage in sexual touching was sentenced “only” to a conditional
sentence with house arrest in part because of his having ASD. In taking what he acknowledged
was an unusual step Anderson J observed that Mr Somogyi had the social age of a 12 year old:
“This was a fantasy world for Mr Somogyi, where he could communicate with children that
were perhaps closer to his own emotional age. It appeared clear to me that part of the com‐
munication with the two undercover officers was sexual in nature, but that part of the
communication was as friends, consisting of sharing music, pictures and conversation. In this
communication, Mr Somogyi could be the knowledgable outgoing leader, not the shy awk‐
ward adult.” (at [36])
The  environment  of  the  Internet  can  enable  persons  with  ASD  to  act  out  their  sexual
attractions and impulses, as well as feelings of distress and anger, without the confront‐
ing exigencies of direct person-to-person interaction. When such a pattern of fascination is
coupled  with  a  reduced  level  of  socialization  and  capacity  for  understanding  of  and
empathy with others’ sensibilities, there is the potential for them to engage in conduct that
is  alienating  and  frightening  but  whose  resonances  and  consequences  are  not  (well)
understood by them. Expert mental health evidence to explicate these limitations on the
part of persons with ASD is extremely important if unfair harshness in sentencing is to be
avoided.
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5. DPP v HPW (2011)
In Director of Public Prosecutions v HPW (2011) the Victorian Court of Appeal heard an appeal
brought by the prosecution contending that the sentencing judge at first instance had wrongly
found a causal connection between HPW’s Asperger’s Disorder and his sexual offending, had
erred in imposing a manifestly inadequate sentence and had inadequately cumulated the
penalties he imposed for a significant number of sex offences.
HPW was found guilty at first instance of eight charges, three of which were representative of
many instances of sex offending, committed against his biological daughter during a time
when she was aged 11 and 12. They involved multiple instances of oral, digital and anal
penetration as well as instances of masturbation and of encouraging the family dog to lick his
daughter’s vagina.
When interviewed by the police, HPW admitted sodomising his daughter and explained that
it was “just as an experiment”. He said by way of explanation that “it was just sexual gratifi‐
cation for myself” and commented that he was “probably a psycho”.
HPW was aged 47 at the time of sentencing and without prior convictions. He had served a
lengthy period of time in the army until he was discharged in 2007 for not handing back some
hand grenades. He had two children from a marriage that lasted over a decade, after which
he formed a relationship that involved bestiality and anal sex with another woman.
A psychologist who examined him formed the view that the offending with his daughter
stopped when “he realised what he was doing”. HPW’s Asperger’s Disorder went undiag‐
nosed until after the criminal charges were laid. A psychologist who assessed him expressed
the view (at [37]) that he had
significant deficits in social interaction; restricted behaviour, interests and activities; clinically significant impairment in
social or other important areas of functioning; no apparent language impairment; and no apparent cognitive impairment.
He is somewhat atypical in his awareness of his deficiencies in empathy and friendship skills.
Another psychologist, Dr Kennedy, whose report was tendered at the plea hearing, stated
(at [47]):
In this case, victim empathy should be commented on for specific reasons, particularly in relation to [HPW]’s cognitive
distortion associated with the offences. In this matter, he has reported that while carrying out the sexual offences he
considered that [his daughter] was experiencing the sexual abuse in a matter-of-fact way as if the activities were normal, and
nothing more than her daily activities.
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Discussion of this issue occurred at some length. I should note that [HPW] did not appear to be attempting to minimise
this behaviour in this [sic], but was attempting to explain how he saw [his daughter’s] response to the sexual abuse. He thought
at the time for her, it was “something to do... as if it was an activity such as playing cards or watching TV” that had no
impact on her at an emotional level. When asked about his understanding of the effects of the sexual abuse on [his daughter],
he reported in a very distinct way that the impact has been “huge... I think I’ve ruined her... she’ll never be able to see
me in the same light... it will be very difficult for her with partners in the future”.
He added (at [50]):
[There is a] focus on deficient empathy, which is clearly relevant in this case, interpersonal naivety which appears to be
the case in this matter, sexual frustration which is clearly relevant in this case, and immediate confession, which from my
understanding, is also present. Additionally, there are sexual preoccupations, which do appear relevant in this case.
Dr Kennedy expressed the view that at the time of his offending HPW was unaware of the
distress he was causing to his daughter but contended that since that time, with professional
assistance, he had acquired genuine empathy and remorse. He observed that there had been
no grooming process, as is often seen in sex offending cases.
The Court of Appeal found that the evidence of the expert gave no support for the foundation
of the plea made on HPW’s behalf, and which was (wrongly) accepted by the sentencing judge,
that HPW misread his daughter’s behaviour as providing encouragement to him by hints or
signals, to engage in the sexual offending. Justice Tate (at [53]), writing the leading judgment,
found that Dr Kennedy’s opinion:
suggested that the sexual offending occurred in a context in which (1) the respondent had sexual preoccupations with
his daughter, fantasising about her in a manner reflective of his previous unusual sexual relationship with an earlier
partner of whom his daughter reminded him; (2) he was sexually frustrated with his current partner; (3) his level of
alcohol abuse led to disinhibition; and (4) his deficient empathy meant that he believed that his sexual offending was
having no emotional impact on his daughter. Dr Kennedy’s opinion did not provide a proper evidentiary base supporting
the finding of the sentencing judge that the respondent ‘may have misinterpreted [his] daughter’s cues’.
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She found that the plea by counsel misrepresented the expert report. To the extent that Dr
Kennedy had commented “it is highly likely that [HPW’s] behaviour is best explained by the
presence of an Autism Spectrum Disorder”, Tate JA found that this could not support the
proposition that there was a causal connection between his conduct and his misreading of his
daughter’s behavioural cues. This led Tate JA (with Neave and Mandie JJA agreeing) to find
a sentencing error to have been committed at trial. They also found that HPW’s Asperger’s
Disorder should not have led to a significant moderation in the sentence imposed upon him,
and that his sentence was not sufficiently cumulated to reflect the “debased and humiliating
nature of the offending, the core breach of trust, or the effect of the offending upon [HPW’s]
daughter” (at [82]).
While the court did not find that HPW’s Asperger’s Disorder reduced his moral blamewor‐
thiness for the purposes of sentencing, it did accept that it was appropriate to view his disorder
as a mitigating factor to the extent that it was likely to make his service of a custodial sentence
more burdensome for him. It ordered his sentence to be increased from seven and a half years’
imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years and six months to nine years and six
months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years and six months.
The HPW decision is a salutary reminder that judges’ evaluation of the relevance of Asperger’s
Disorder will vary from case to case, depending upon factors such as the severity of the
disorder, the nature of the offending and the proven relationship between the disorder and
the particular offending. On some occasions it will be regarded by sentencers as powerfully
relevant, while on others it may be found nearly irrelevant. This is consistent with the position
with psychiatric disorders that more commonly intersect with the cases determined by the
criminal courts – for instance, the fact alone that a person satisfies the DSM criteria for
schizophrenia does not of itself relieve the person of criminal responsibility or culpability.
However, more can be observed. A real question will arise on occasions about the extent in a
meaningful sense that a person with ASD will be aware, other than at a superficial or, to them,
a theoretical level, of the wrongfulness of their behaviour and of the consequences that it is
likely to bring for their victim. In such a situation, real questions arise in relation to their
criminal culpability and therefore the basis upon which they should be sentenced. This issue
is at its most confronting when, as in the HPW case, the conduct is particularly unpleasant.
6. R v Sokaluk (2012)
Brendan Sokaluk was convicted by a jury in Melbourne, Australia, of ten counts of arson
causing death, an offence carrying a maximum sentence of 25 years of imprisonment for each
charge. The sentencing judge, Justice Coghlan of the Supreme Court of Victoria, found that
Sokaluk had intentionally lit a fire in eucalypt plantations and in two other places, knowing
that his actions would cause damage, and in fact causing the deaths of ten people. He accepted
that Sokaluk did not intend to cause loss of life but found that, nonetheless, the fact was that
he did cause multiple deaths on a day that became known in Australia as “Black Saturday”,
when strong winds built up and temperatures exceeded 46 degrees Celsius.
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Evidence before the jury showed that when he was being evacuated from the fire zone Sokaluk
told a lie because his father earlier in the day had advised him not to go to the hills. This was
but one of a number of untruths told by Sokaluk and which raised the issue of whether he
understood full well that his actions were wrongful and could lead to adverse consequences.
Another occurred on the next day when he returned to the scene of one of the fires and saw
that his car had been destroyed by the fire. Within an hour and a half he made a claim on his
insurance policy. Justice Coghlan found that his level of functioning during the call “was at
the very least reasonable” (at [23]). He drew adverse inferences for Sokaluk’s level of under‐
standing and functioning from this conduct.
In the next days Sokaluk made various comments about who had been responsible for lighting
the fire and then on the Tuesday made a false and self-serving report to police that he had seen
a fire fighter driving a four wheel utility lighting one of the fires. Justice Coghlan characterized
this report as “a deliberate and careful attempt to attach the blame to others.” (at [25]) Later
Sokaluk acknowledged to police that he had made the report so that he would not be blamed
for the fire. When police spoke to him some days later, he told them that he had been smoking
in his car and asserted that a piece of paper must have ignited, after which he panicked, and
some time later reported the fire to authorities. However, Coghlan J noted that expert evidence
repudiated the feasibility of his account. How these situations were interpreted by the
sentencing judge was that since Sokaluk was able to function to some extent in an apparently
reasoned and sophisticated way in the aftermath of his fire-lighting he was significantly
culpable for his criminal conduct because of having the capacity to understand the nature of
what he was doing. The legitimacy of such judicial reasoning is a function of whether the two
scenarios were properly commensurate for a person with ASD. At the time of writing, the case
is subject to appeal.
The sentencing judge reviewed in some detail the catastrophic nature of the fire and drew
particular attention to the “self-sacrifice and courage” of the volunteers in the area who fought
the fire. He took into account the hurtful nature of the way in which the fires had started
because of Sokaluk and the life-changing nature of the fires for those who survived them.
Justice Coghlan received a substantial amount of material about Sokaluk who was 42 years of
age at the time of sentencing and had no prior convictions. He received multiple expert reports
which led him to conclude that Sokaluk suffered from an ASD and was intellectually disabled
to a “reasonably mild degree” (at [46]). He noted that Sokaluk had grown up in the local area
and had experienced difficulties during his schooling. He attended a “special school” for
children with disabilities but managed to gain employment at a university where he worked
as an assistant gardener for some 16 to 17 years. Justice Coghlan concluded that Sokaluk was
teased and perhaps bullied in the workplace as he had been at school. Interestingly, and
perhaps suggestive of his having a problematic interest in fires, he also worked for the Country
Fire Authority but ceased employment in about 2006 and went onto a disability pension. He
owned his own house and lived there alone but was dependent on his parents for cooking,
cleaning and managing his finances. He had had two serious relationships with women and
was closely emotionally connected to his dog.
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Justice Coghlan accepted that Sokaluk had a “mental impairment” for the purposes of
sentencing by reason of his conditions of autism and intellectual disability. He had regard to
what he classified as Sokaluk’s “reduced moral culpability” and stated that he had moderated
general deterrence as a factor to which he had regard in sentencing. He concluded that
“personal deterrence looms somewhat larger for you than it might for others.” (at [66]) He
stated that he regarded Sokaluk as “genuinely remorseful” and accepted that he did not “set
out to achieve this awful result” (at [66]). He accepted that the sentence of imprisonment that
that he imposed would “weigh more heavily upon you than on others” (at [66]).
So far as expert evidence was concerned, Coghlan J received multiple forensic mental health
expert reports but had particular regard to that of Professor James Ogloff, the Director of the
Centre for Forensic Behavioural Science and Foundation Professor of Clinical Forensic
Psychology at Monash University. Professor Ogloff observed that Mr Sokaluk:
“would occasionally stare blankly ahead. … He did not appear emotionally distressed or anxious. He displayed repetitive
motor behaviour which consisted of lightly touching the edge of the table that separated us and moving his hands together
and apart slowly. This behaviour subsided over the course of the interview. Mr Sokaluk demonstrated very concrete
literal thinking. He appeared emotionally blunted and socially immature. (Psychological Court Report, 22 December
2012, para 5)
Professor Ogloff noted Sokaluk’s assessed level of intellectual functioning, measured overall
at an IQ of 74 and another psychologist’s assessment that his profile was typical of a person
with autism. He took into account that Sokaluk’s relative strengths were in the areas of visual
perception, non-verbal processing and attention to visual detail, while his weaknesses were
in the ability to comprehend and/or respond to questions. Professor Ogloff expressed the view
that the autistic symptoms experienced by Sokaluk “have been debilitating and dysfunctional,
resulting in difficulties in relationships, employment and general life skills.” (Psychological
Court Report, 22 December 2012, para 9). He emphasized Sokaluk’s response to the question
of who the person was who was most important to him. Sokaluk responded that it was his dog
and related very detailed, anthropomorphizing accounts of his dog. While Sokaluk was
dependant upon his father, there was little evidence of emotional connection with him.
Professor Ogloff concluded that Sokaluk was fit to stand trial, although he thought he would
experience some difficulties in following the evidence, and that the defence of mental impair‐
ment (insanity) was not available to him. Professor Ogloff expressed the view that Sokaluk
was not a pyromaniac but did not feel able to identify with confidence the characteristics or
motivations which had led him to engage in his fire-setting behaviours, other than to say that
if he did deliberately light the relevant fire his motivation was probably expressive (namely a
means of emotional expression, given his social inadequacies)
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Mr Sokaluk meets the criteria for a diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder. This disorder has affected his social and
adaptive functioning all of his life. He does not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of a major mental illness or personality
disorder at present, although he has been treated with medication in the community for depression and in prison for
lowered mood and anxiety.
Whilst his overall level of intellectual functioning is in the borderline range, his verbal capacity is more limited and, in
fact, falls in the intellectually disabled range. Conversely, his perceptual capabilities are much better, falling in the low
average range. This suggests that while Mr Sokaluk has been able to hold a job, operate a motor vehicle, and live on his
own, his level of intellectual reasoning and verbal comprehension is very impoverished. He has been dependent on his
parents for maintaining his finances, cleaning his house, and providing him with meals. It takes him much longer to
acquire information or to learn a task than would be the case for most others and his abstract reasoning capacity is very
limited. His presentation, reasoning, receptive and expressive language are affected by the confluence of his Autism
Spectrum Disorder and decreased level of intellectual functioning. For example, he is a very concrete and literal thinker.
Justice Coghlan sentenced Sokaluk to a total effective sentence of imprisonment of 17 years
and 9 months, with 14 years to elapse before he would be eligible for parole. Both the Director
of Public Prosecutions and Sokaluk appealed against the sentence, the one contending it was
too short, the other that it was too long. At the time of writing the appeal had not been heard.
The Sokaluk appeal raises for consideration the relevance of ASD (and an intellectual disabil‐
ity) to the evaluation of criminal culpability when the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the
consequences of his behaviour is reduced by reason of his disorder. Expert evidence before
the court suggested that Sokaluk’s intellectual and abstract reasoning were at a low level, that
his emotional connections with people were poor and that he had been ill-treated over a period
of time by reason of his difficulties in communicating and interacting with others. However,
Sokaluk was far from wholly disabled and to varying extents had been able to function within
the community and had some capacity to appreciate that forms of behaviour are unacceptable
and wrong. Thus, the question arises as to how severely he should have been punished and
deterred from conduct whose terrible repercussions he was found not to have set out to achieve
and whose ability to foresee and appreciate was unclear.
7. State of Western Australia v Mack (2012)
Brent Mack was charged with the murder of his mother but in an application that he made for
a judge-alone trial questions arose about his fitness for trial on the basis of his suffering from
autism. His counsel swore an affidavit expressing the view that there was a risk that Mack
would not participate in the trial in any way, including the provision of instructions, thus
making his defence extremely difficult.
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A psychiatrist retained for Mack expressed the view that Mack was unfit to stand trial because
of his inability to follow the course of the trial and to defend the charges against him:
He has impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviours, including eye contact and body posture; a lack of social
reciprocity; the failure to develop any appropriate peer relationships. He also exhibits impairments in communication in
relation to the inability to sustain a conversation; stereotyped use of language; monotonous speech with an abnormal,
robotic rhythm to it; and inability to understand the nonliteral aspects of communication or applied meaning.... [H]is
ability to understand the abstract is virtually absent and everything is very much concrete interpretations of things.(State
of Western Australia v Mack, 2012: [19])
When asked about the contrast between this presentation and Mack’s manner in his records
of interview, the psychiatrist stated that he had heard Mack speaking in a similar way to his
responses in the records of interview when he spoke to members of a working party about
native plants, a subject in which he had a particular interest. He expressed the view that Mack
did not process emotion, particularly negative emotion, his response tending to be one of
retreat from a situation physically or into himself. In such circumstances his deficits in short
term memory and concrete thinking were exacerbated. He expressed the view that:
Mr Mack tends to be quite dichotomous in his thinking, so from my assessment of him, he divides things into a personal
context - that's his language - personal context or some other context, such as a business context. If anything is relevant
to himself personally, he tends to have a somewhat all-or-nothing approach to that. So he obliterates that from discussion
completely. If it's something to do with something about which he's factually knowledgeable, then he's probably happy
to talk at length about it. … from my interviews with Mr Mack, I would expect that he would be very reluctant to talk
about any matters that might arise during the course of the trial (State of Western Australia v Mack, 2012: [24]).
A psychiatrist called by the prosecution, although agreeing on the diagnosis, and conceding
a potential for Mack’s cognitive ability or performance to deteriorate during the trial because
of anxiety, expressed the view that he was fit for trial. He accepted that Mack had a propensity
to focus on the way in which questions were asked, rather than their substance but concluded
there was no evidence to “suggest the presence of any difficulties in registration” of the content
of communications to which he was privy.
Justice McKechnie accepted that the behaviour of Mack was unusual but found the evidence
of the psychiatrist called by the prosecution to be more consistent with the performance of
Mack during his records of interview. He concluded that “It is likely that the accused’s current
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presentation is more as a result of choice coupled with his autism than a result simply of his
mental impairment.” (State of Western Australia v Mack, 2012: [24]). He placed little weight on
the submission that Mack’s odd presentation might cause him prejudice before jurors who
might be distracted by it or draw adverse inferences against him (cp McGraddie v McGraddie,
2009; Parish v DPP, 2007). However, he concluded that because of Mack’s autism and its impact
on the trial process generally, the interests of justice weighed in favour of a trial by judge alone
(State of Western Australia v Mack, 2012: [44]).
The decision of McKechnie J highlights the difficulty encountered by those with ASD in being
able effectively to communicate with and give instructions to their lawyers in the unwonted
and intimidating atmosphere of the courtroom. While persons with ASD may be articulate and
contextually appropriate when conversing about a subject of interest or fascination that is non-
threatening, a wrong inference may be extrapolated that they are capable “if they simply make
an effort” of speaking with their lawyers, understanding testimony and its import for their
defence, and giving evidence in a courtroom. While the discontinuity between these contexts
is not immediately obvious, the nature of ASD, if well explained by a mental health expert,
has the potential to be compelling.
Another aspect of Mack’s case that is significant is the failure of the trial judge to accept that
the conduct of the defendant might be highly prejudicial and, in particular, be misinterpreted
and misconstrued by a jury. This is a problematic issue for defendants with ASD because of
their propensity to conduct themselves oddly and with apparent disinterest in the circum‐
stances of their victim and the ramifications of their conduct. There is often a risk that their
manner, their words and their reactions may lead jurors and judicial officers who are unin‐
structed in the characteristics and symptomatology of ASD to draw wrong and damaging
inferences (see eg McGraddie v McGraddie, 2009; Parish v DPP, 2007).
8. Challenges for mental health expert evidence
The 2011/2012 decisions by courts in HPW, Sokaluk and Hampson illustrate the risk that ASD
will not to be found by judicial officers to have a major relevance for the determination of
criminal culpability. What each case has in common is conduct that is such as to prompt high
levels of censure by reference to ordinary community standards and thus a risk that such
considerations will overbear subtle issues relating to the personal blameworthiness of an
offender. However, there is reason to suspect that in each case the defendant’s ASD constituted
at least a significant context within which the criminal conduct was committed and there is
reason to postulate that it may have had a sufficient influence on the conduct to have been a
genuinely mitigating factor in terms of each offender’s moral blameworthiness.
The decisions of George, Sokaluk and Mack are exemplary of cases where wrong inferences may
be drawn by reason of the capacity of persons with ASD to conduct themselves in ways
comparable to how others with full capacity might behave. There is a need in many criminal
trial contexts that deal with persons with ASD for expert evidence that is counter-intuitive and
directed toward the need for care to be taken by decision-makers, judicial or lay (ie jurors), in
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drawing inferences on the basis of otherwise known conduct and capacities of persons with
ASD, especially when different scenarios in defendants’ lives are compared. Capacity is highly
situation-related, and for all of us is variable by reference to context. Persons with ASD may
be high-functioning in some contexts but when comfort zones are intruded upon or when they
are outside an environment that is structured or familiar, their conduct may be erratic, their
judgment poor and their capacity to appreciate the resonances and repercussions of their
actions limited. This is relevant both to their capacity to function effectively within a trial
context, including their fitness to stand trial, and to their criminal responsibility and moral
blameworthiness for actions for which they are being tried.
Fitzgerald (2010) has postulated a subcategory of ASD that he calls “Criminal Autistic
Psychopathy”, characterised, he says, by persons with callous, unemotional traits who
repeatedly engage in anti-social criminal conduct. He has instanced a number of serial killers
who he maintains have combined features of ASD and Psychopathy. While there are theoret‐
ically fundamental differences between the two disorders, the former for instance being a
developmental disorder, Fitzgerald makes a persuasive argument for the overlap of traits/
symptoms in some persons. For these individuals the existence of conjoint pathology or a
hybrid disorder is particularly problematic at sentencing as it is most likely to arouse concerns
in relation to the need for protection of the community rather than an empathic focus on
impaired levels of moral blameworthiness.
Finally, two other important issues consistently arise in criminal cases. The behaviour of a
person with ASD at trial can be alienating and highly prejudicial. This bears upon whether
they should be accorded the opportunity for a judge-alone trial, where that facility exists (see
eg State of Western Australia v Mack, 2012), or whether expert evidence to disabuse jurors of
misimpressions they might otherwise form should be permitted. In addition, the capacity of
a person with ASD to cope without decompensating, being dangerously victimised or having
the anxiety and depressive symptomatology, which is often part of an ASD (see eg R v
Sokaluk, 2012), exacerbated within a custodial environment frequently needs to be the subject
of expert opinion evidence from professionals with a sound understanding of the impact of
ASD on day-to-day functioning for those with the disorder.
The challenge for mental health professionals who seek to educate courts about the relevance
of ASD to decision-making about accused persons’ responsibility for criminal conduct and
their blameworthiness for their actions lies in identifying the causative role of ASD and its
repercussions for the imposition of custodial sanctions. The reality of ASD is that it is easily
misdiagnosed as it can easily fail to be identified, it can it can co-exist with a variety of other
disorders – anxiety, depressive and personality - and it can be highly exculpatory or at least
explanatory. On other occasions though it is no more than part of a context and is not partic‐
ularly mitigating at all. More than simply identifying the disorder by correct diagnostics, the
real issue for mental health professionals is to evaluate in a rigorous and informed way how
ASD fits into the picture of criminal culpability for a particular individual in respect of
particular conduct at a particular time.
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